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Vaughn and Tyerman: God’s War: A New History of the Crusades

Among the book’s strengths are the
subheadings of each chapter, which allow the reader to skip around. Vego’s
sixty-seven pages of notes are excellent,
enabling the reader to delve deeper into
the battle, and his bibliography is outstanding. There are sixteen appendixes
showing the order of battle of the adversaries, as well as six excellent maps.
Vego’s conclusion, while offering nothing new, does an outstanding job of
summarizing the battle. Also, his summary of Halsey’s failure in the battle is
superior. Professor Vego concludes that
“the Japanese came close to accomplishing their mission not because of
their skills but because of the mistakes
that Halsey made.”
DONALD M. GOLDSTEIN

University of Pittsburgh

Tyerman, Christopher. God’s War: A New History
of the Crusades. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press, 2006. 1,024pp. $35

Christopher Tyerman, a lecturer in medieval history at Oxford University, offers this work at a crucial moment. With
world attention focused as it is on the
Middle East and on the social, political,
religious, and military interactions between the Muslim East and Christian
West, God’s War could not have come at
a more opportune time, especially for
those who wish to have a better understanding of this exotic and violent period. Over the past decade, the subject of
the Crusades has become a popular one
for writers, but Steven Runciman’s
three-volume History of the Crusades remains the primary standard of comparison. Tyerman accurately, if perhaps with
a bit of hubris, notes that Runciman’s
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work is now outdated and seriously
flawed. What makes Tyerman’s work
stand out is the extent of his knowledge
of the entire crusading era and his ability to deploy that knowledge in a clear,
concise, and generally readable manner
in the course of a single (if massive)
volume.
God’s War is reasonably if not totally
comprehensive. The first four Crusades
are covered in minute detail, the later
Crusades less so. Tyerman, however,
also discusses many related movements
not normally considered as crusades,
such as the Reconquista in Spain and
Teutonic campaigns in the Baltic, and
even the expansion of the concept of
holy war to the conquest of the New
World. This breadth of coverage makes
up for an occasional lack of depth. At
times the book does suffer from an
overreliance on name-dropping, some
of which is repetitive and, for the novice, confusing.
Tyerman stresses that one cannot know
how the Crusaders thought or felt—
making it ironic when he comments, as
he frequently does, on what did or did
not motivate them. This is peculiar, as
one of the strongest points of the book is
its explanation of how the movement
originated and the ways in which the
Crusades were products of the sometimes
paradoxical social, religious, and political
forces of the Middle Ages. Another strong
point is his descriptions of the personalities of the Crusaders. Tyerman fleshes out
the leaders, men like the Christians
Godfrey of Bullion and Bohemond,
Frederick Barbarossa, or Richard of
Anjou, and the Muslim leaders Saladin
and Baybars. These people are described
from the standpoint both of their apologists and their critics and enemies,
and thus as true three-dimensional
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personalities. Through these descriptions,
Tyerman creates after all a snapshot of
how the crucesignati and jihadi thought,
and in particular how they were influenced by the concept of holy war.
Tyerman avoids the controversy of the
influence of the Crusades on events in
the Middle East today. He outlines the
Christian concept of just war and holy
war without assessing whether the Crusades were just. He describes the Muslim concept of jihad, yet does not pass
judgment on the initial conquest or
reconquest of the Hold Land by the
Arabs. Additionally, he does not address Western guilt over the Crusades
or the Islamic feeling of having been
wronged. Only in passing does he mention a certain pope’s apology and a certain politician’s ill-timed use of the
word “crusade.” In a word, he neither
condemns nor apologizes for the actions and violence of Christians or
Muslims but clearly lays out the social,
religious, political, and economic
causes and results of the Crusades.
For readers searching for a single-volume
survey of the crusading movement,
Christopher Tyerman’s God’s War is
invaluable.
MARK K. VAUGHN

Naval War College

Reynolds, David. From World War to Cold War:
Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History
of the 1940s. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006.
363pp. $45

In this insightful and elegantly written
set of essays in international history,
David Reynolds ruminates on the
causes, evolution, and consequences of
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what came to be called the “special relationship” between the United States
and Great Britain during the Second
World War and thereafter through the
Cold War. Geostrategically, this relationship originated with the fall of
France in May 1940, which Reynolds
treats quite rightly as the “fulcrum of
the Twentieth Century.” Until then,
British leaders had counted on France
to contain Germany, with England
making only a limited commitment of
ground forces to the continent and relying on a powerful deterrent based on
strategic bombing. In 1940, with the
French knocked out of the war and
England’s small army in ruins, whether
the British could fight on against Germany’s Wehrmacht depended above all
on support from the United States.
Winston Churchill’s decision to continue fighting turned out to be the right
policy chosen for the wrong reasons,
because Franklin D. Roosevelt was initially unwilling to supply more than
material aid and was later unable to
bring Americans into the war until both
Japan and Germany declared war on
the United States. Shared hatred of a vicious enemy, a more or less common
language, generally similar liberal political principles, shared intelligence,
combined military staffs, summitry,
and the industrial prowess of the
United States was to make the AngloAmerican alliance perhaps more effective than any other in history.
Year by year, however, British influence
within the Grand Alliance waned as
American power waxed. In the spirit of
Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt sought an
alternative to traditional alliances in his
vision of postwar international peace
and security cooperation by means of
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